A physical unclonable function (PUF), analogous to a human fingerprint, has gained an enormous amount of attention from both academia and industry. SRAM PUF is among one of the popular silicon PUF constructions that exploits random initial power-up states from SRAM cells to extract hardware intrinsic secrets for identification and key generation applications. The advantage of SRAM PUFs is that they are widely embedded into commodity devices, thus such a PUF is obtained without a custom design and virtually free of implementation costs. A phenomenon known as 'aging' alters the consistent reproducibility-reliability-of responses that can be extracted from a readout of a set of SRAM PUF cells. Similar to how a PUF exploits undesirable manufacturing randomness for generating a hardware intrinsic fingerprint, SRAM PUF unreliability induced by aging can be exploited to detect recycled commodity devices requiring no additional cost to the device. In this context, the SRAM PUF itself acts as an aging sensor by exploiting responses sensitive to aging. We use SRAMs available in pervasively deployed commercial off-the-shelf micro-controllers for experimental validations, which complements recent work demonstrated in FPGA platforms, and we present a simplified detection methodology along experimental results. We show that less than 1,000 SRAM responses are adequate to guarantee that both false acceptance rate and false rejection rate are no more than 0.001.
Introduction
Electronic components are increasingly integrated and introduced into every domain of our lives. They are pervasively employed in Internet of Thing (IoT) devices such as wireless sensors in smart homes and health-care applications in civilian use cases to military and aerospace components in defense. However, over the past decade, counterfeit electronic components or integrated circuits (ICs) have flooded into every aspect of supply chains [1] . Counterfeit ICs pose great concerns for: i) governments, threating national security or civilian safety due to their poor quality leading to lower performance or malfunctions that may result in critical system failures-e.g., transportation, hospital and power-station facilities, in addition, to tax revenue losses; ii) industry, they cause direct revenue loss and further ruin brand value; iii) consumers, they can induce potential safety concerns when they are employed in security or health critical applications due to the low quality and reliability issues [2] .
Combating counterfeit ICs involves securing untrusted supply chains resulting from the globalization of the semiconductor industry; one needs to trace, check and detect counterfeits along the supply chain within their lifecycles. Among various countermeasures, the physical unclonable function (PUF) is one promising lightweight hardware security primitive that assigns each IC with a unique identifier upon its creation, similar to fingerprints of humans [3, 4, 5, 6] . Since PUF exploits manufacturing randomness, it is impossible for the counterfeiter to physically clone such instance-specific identifiers in the atomby-atom level. Thus, the PUF is able to prevent counterfeiting ICs from several sources including cloned and overproduced ones. However, they were not considered to detect remarked and recycled counterfeit ICs [2] until recent work from [7] . Extending PUF's functionality to detect remarked or recycled ICs is considerably valuable, as they contribute to more than 80% of reported counterfeit incidents [8] .
Previous PUF applications focused on identification or authentication and key generation applications [9, 10] . In both, it is desirable for a PUF to regenerate the same response (output) when queried by the same challenge (input). However, in practice, the reliability of responses corresponding to certain challenges are affected by variations in environmental factors and aging effects. In typical PUFbased applications, for instance, cryptographic key genera- tion requiring highly stable responses [11] , it is imperative to improve PUF reliability and correct potential bit errors prior to deriving a key. In PUF-based authentication applications [12, 3] , it is still preferable to maximize reliability to reduce the number of response bits needed to uniquely identify a PUF instance from a large population and increase the complexity of modeling attacks by an adversary [13, 14, 15] .
In contrast, we take advantage of unavoidable unreliability of responses resulting from aging effects to provide a high degree of assurance to sense the period of aging experienced by PUF integrated ICs. In particular, we consider exploiting SRAM PUFs that are available in most commodity electronic systems or system on chips (SoCs), where neither additional area cost nor custom modification is required, to detect recycled commodity SoCs. The SRAM PUF is more suitable in this context in comparison with other popular silicon PUF structures such as Arbiter PUFs (APUF) and Ring Oscillator PUFs (ROPUFs) [16, 17, 18] do requiring additional cost such as adding logic circuitry into existing electronic components using customized designs. Our work complement the recent work in [7] utilizing SRAM PUFs to detect recycled devices demonstrated on FPGA platforms. We summarize our contributions below:
1. We evaluate and validate detection of recycled SoCs by using ubiquitously deployed micro-controllers that are commonly embedded with SRAM memories. 2. We develop a simplified aging sensitive response (ASR) selection methodology and detail how to systemically evaluate and quantify the detection capability. The detection is cost-free to the commodity SoCs since all the computations are left to the resource-rich verifier that carries out the detection. 3. Our investigations with experimental results demonstrate that the aging-induced unreliability of SRAM PUFs in SoCs can effectively detect recycled SoCs with very high accuracy. Our ASR methodology allows to use less than 1,000 SRAM responses to ensure that both false rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) are less than 0.001. In addition, experimental results validate that the detection accuracy increases with prolonged aging periods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, we detail the simplified ASR selection methodology and how to systematically evaluate the detection capability. The simplified response selection approach during the provisioning phase is introduced in order to improve the detection efficiency in the recycled hardware detection phase by employing responses that are more sensitive to aging effects. Then comprehensive experimental results from offthe-shelf commodity microcontrollers embedded SRAM PUFs are given in Section 4. In Section 5 we conclude this article.
Background and Related Work

SRAM PUF
Unlike the other two popular silicon PUF constructions, ROPUFs and APUFs that exploit time delay differences [3] to extract secrets, SRAM PUFs [20, 19] leverage the threshold voltage V th mismatch between two crosscoupled inverters of a SRAM cell resulting from manufacturing randomness. As a memory cell, a write operation forces the SRAM cell to transition into one of two digital states, e.g., '0' or '1'. When a cell is powered up or no write operation is occurred, the SRAM cell tends to prefer a repeatable power-up state-also referred as a responseeither being '1' (AB=01) or '0' (AB=10). As an example, if the V th,P1 is slightly smaller than V th,P2 , at power-up, M 1 starts conducting before M 2 , thus, A = 1. This in turn prevents M 2 switching on. As a consequence, the SRAM cell at power-up prefers to be '0' (AB=10). Larger |V th,P1 − V th,P2 | leads to more repeatable power-up states or more reliable responses when the cell is used to regenerate the response. Such a repeatable power-up state differs from cell to cell and chip to chip as well, thus, a map of the power-up states of a set of SRAM cells can be treated as a unique identifier, or the SRAM memory array can be treated as a PUF. In particular, the readout SRAM powerup state is referred to as the response, while the address of the SRAM cell is referred to as the challenge.
Sensing Aging with SRAM PUFs
However, some of SRAM PUF responses are not reproducible due to that fact that the V th difference of a selected cell is not dominant in the presence of noise from environmental factors such as supply voltage and temperature variations and aging effects. In elementary PUF-oriented identification and authentication applications, those unreliable responses are undesirable. In contrast, and just as undesirable fabrication randomness is extracted to create instance-specific PUFs to derive a physical inseparable trust anchor for a hardware device, a PUF response's sensitivity to environmental factors and aging can also be utilized to secure sensing. In this context, sensing functionality is derived from a PUF and the PUF lends itself as a sensor to guarantee the veracity of sensed data [21, 22, 23, 7, 24] .
Detecting recycled devices using SRAM PUFs by considering those PUF responses sensitive to aging effects was recently received attention and initially investigated in [7] . Guo et al. used SRAM cells in FPGA platforms for experimental validations. We complement this initial investigation using SRAM memory in pervasively deployed off-theshelf micro-controllers as they are commonly deployed in many SoCs ranging from home appliances to various sensors in the Internet of Things (IoT) era. We present a simpler methodology of selecting aging sensitive response bits and detail a systematic approach to evaluate and quantify recycled SoC detection capability supported by experimental data.
SRAM Aging
Silicon ICs performance deteriorates gradually over time attributing to various factors such as hot carrier injection (HCI), time-dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB) and bias temperature instability (BTI) [25, 7] . The negative BTI (NBTI) plays dominant aging effect in modern ICs, especially for switched-on pMOS transistors [25] .
The NBTI effect increases the threshold voltage of pMOS transistors when a transistor is 'on'. Considering the example in Section 2.1 where the SRAM is powered up without a write operation. Consider that we already knew AB=10, where the M 1 is 'on' and experiences a gradually increased V th,P1 due to the NBTI, while the V th,P2 remains or changes negligibly with respect to V th,P1 . Hence, over time, V th,P1 > V th,P2 . As a consequence, the regenerated responses over the life of such cells tend to shift from being reliably generated '0' to '1'. Though anti-aging strategies are possible [25] , its expensive time and monetary cost prohibit a counterfeiter to do so, especially for low-end ICs. The bit flipping over time caused by the response sensitivity to aging is undesirable for conventional PUF applications, but can be exploited to detect recycled commodity SoCs widely embedded with SRAM memories.
Detection Methodology
Only a small fraction of SRAM responses are sensitive to aging over time; we will experimentally show this in Section 4. In other words, most response bits are actually reproduced consistently across a wide range of operating conditions and aging effects. Such response bits are desirable for elementary PUF authentication and key generation applications, but cannot be utilized for sensing aging as they are invariant to aging effects.
Therefore, we need to first efficiently select and determine those ASRs during the provisioning phase-after the SoCs are fabricated but prior being delivered through a(n) (insecure) supply chain-to facilitate detection of recycled SoCs in the detection phase later on. Hence, we develop a simplified methodology of selecting and determining ASRs followed by elaborating on how to systematically evaluate the detection capability utilizing those ASRs.
Before delving into detailed descriptions, we give a number of useful definitions to ease the following descriptions, especially the systematic detection capability evaluations.
3.1. Preliminaries Definition 1. InterA-distance. The interA-distance is a random variable describing the distance between two PUF responses R PreA , R PostA produced before aging and after aging by applying the same challenge-address in case of a SRAM PUF-to the same PUF, hence,
where R PreA , R PostA are two responses generated before and after aging by applying the same challenge to the same PUF.
Definition 2. IntraA-distance. The intraA-distance is a random variable describing the distance between two PUF responses R A , R A re-evaluated on the same PUF, using the same challenge before aging.
where R A , R A are two responses obtained from the same PUF using the same chosen challenge before aging.
The dist(.;.) can be any well-defined and appropriate distance metric over the responses. In this paper, responses are always bit vectors and the used distance metric is Hamming distance (HD) or fractional Hamming distance formally defined below: Definition 3. Hamming distance. For bit vectors X 1 and X 2 with the same length l, the HD between them is defined as:
Definition 4. Fractional Hamming distance. Built upon Eq. (3), the fractional Hamming distance (FHD) is defined as:
Readers who are familiar with PUFs will notice that the definition of the interA-distance is similar to the interdistance of PUFs that measures the difference between two responses from two distinct PUF instances given the same challenge. The difference is that the interA-distance is evaluated across differing aging periods subject to the same PUF instance, the inter-distance is, however, evaluated across different PUF instances.
The intraA-distance is similar to the intra-distance of PUF responses that measures the difference between two responses reproduced from two distinct evaluations by applying the same challenge to the same randomly chosen PUF instance. The main difference is that the intra-distance does not consider the source of aging, it simply treats any environmental fluctuation, e.g., supply voltage, temperature and also aging effects as noise sources. However, in this work, we are able to finely fix the supply voltage and temperature, only thermal noise is treated as a noise source. The aging effects is not a noise source but is exploited to detect aging devices.
Similar to the inter-distance and intra-distance distribution of PUFs explained in detail in [26] , both of the interA-distance and intraA-distance can be assumed to follow a binomial distribution B(n, p). The binomial probability estimator of interA-distance and intraA-distance distributions are referred to asp interA andp intraA , respectively. In general, thep interA is the probability that R PreA = R PostA , see Definition 1, and thep intraA is the probability that R A = R A , see Definition 2. Clearly one single challenge-response pair or CRP is not able to correctly detect an aged device. We need to use multiple response bits or a number of CRPs to minimize the error for: i) mistakenly accepting a response from a PUF that has not undergone aging, referred as false acceptance rate (FAR); and ii) falsely rejecting an authentic response when it a regenerated from an aged PUF, referred as false rejection rate (FRR). It is imperative to minimize both FAR and FRR in practice. More generally, FAR stands for the probability of incorrectly regarding a new device as an aged one. While FRR stands for the probability of an aged device being falsely rejected as a new device.
Detecting Capability
These two undesirable errors are illustrated in Fig. 2 . The right tail of the intraA-distance distribution indicates the FRR, while the left tail of the interA-distance distribution depicts the FAR. When the length of response bits or the number of CRPs, n, and the threshold n th used for achieving a desirable FAR and FRR, and considering that both interA-distance and intraA-distance follow a binomial distribution, FAR and FRR can be formally expressed following work in [27, 26] :
Based on (5) and (6), we can see that the FRR and FAR depend on thep intraA andp interA , the threshold n th , and the number of employed CRPs n. For example, supposing n is 64 as shown in Fig. 2 , a large n th benefits the false rejection rate but aggravates the false acceptance rate, and vice versa for a small n th . We want to minimize both FAR and FRR in practice. There exists a threshold value to make both FAR and FRR equal. We refer this interested threshold value as equal error threshold, termed n EER . Consequentially, when both error rates are equal, we refer this equal rate as equal error rate (EER) following Roel's work [26] . For a discrete distribution, there may not be an n EER for which FAR is equal to FRR, and in that case, n EER and EER are defined as in [26] :
n EER = argmin n th {max{FAR(n th ), FRR(n th )}}, (7) EER = max{FAR(n EER ), FRR(n EER )}.
Given binomial probability estimatorp interA andp intraA , the task is to find minimal number of CRPs, n, for ensuring an acceptable EER that meet desired requirements.
To increase the capability of distinguishing recycled devices from new ones and minimize both FAR and FRR, it is imperative to increase the difference betweenp intraA andp interA . We can visually observe this in Fig. 2 . For example, when the interA-distance distribution shifts to right and intraA-distance distribution keeps same, it is clear that both FAR and FRR will be reduced as the overlapped area becomes small. Therefore, we introduce an approach to select SRAM responses that are of higher sensitivity to aging to increase the difference betweenp intraA andp interA .
Selecting ASRs
It has been shown when a SRAM cell is under high temperature, V th increases in a similar manner to that caused by aging [7] . Therefore, during provisioning phase, the SRAM PUF responses can be re-evaluated under room temperature (RT) and high temperature (HT), respectively, to select aging sensitive responses (ASRs). Notably, the high temperature setting is only necessary during the provisioning phase and is not required during the detection phase. The ASR selection follows Algorithm 1.
The proposed ASR selection method is straightforward and simpler in comparison with [7] . During the provisioning phase, the response r is regenerated N times under RT generating response rHT i under HT using PUF; 7: end for 8: if (all rRT i same) && (all rHT i same) && (rRT =rHT) then 9: select aging sensitive response r; and HT respectively. The r is selected as an ASR when all regenerated r are same under RT and HT, respectively, but exhibit opposite values. For example, the regenerated r exhibits '1' for all N evaluations under RT and '0' for all N evaluations under HT. Then this r is selected as a ASR. Otherwise, it is discarded and will not be utilized for detecting aging SoCs in the afterward detection phase.
When ASRs are selected, therep intraA andp interA can be heuristically evaluated. We assumep intraA is less than p interA , and this is true as we will show in Section 4.
Experimental Results
Experiment Setup
SRAM PUF CRP dataset is collected from three chip-KIT Pro MX7 microcontroller boards. From each board, we read power-up states from 262,144 SRAM cells as SRAM PUF responses. The nominal power supply voltage is 3.25 V. We are able to change the voltage from 3.125 V to 3.50 V. We found that the voltage, however, has negligible effects on the SRAM PUF reliability under test, which agrees with other experimental results [26] . Therefore, we focus on SRAM PUF reliability performance as shown in Fig. 3 that isp intraA before aging under nine different temperature corners: −5
• C, 15
• C. The room temperature 25
• C is treated as the nominal or reference corner. We are mostly interested in thep intraA under RT, which is approximately 6% as shown in Fig. 3 .
To test the aging influence on the SRAM PUF response's reliability, we put the microcontroller board in the oven of 80
• C to accelerate the aging. For expected NBTI aging, the acceleration factor (AF) is expressed [25] :
where the parameters setting are: the gate voltage exponent α = 3.5; the time exponent m = 0.25; the apparent activation energy E aa = −0.02eV ; and Boltzmann's constant k = 8.62 × 10 −5 eV /K. We only consider temperature resulted stress, where V stress = V nominal , T stress = 80
• C, T nominal = 25
• C. As a consequence, we are able to obtain AF=11.03. After 48 hours of accelerated aging that is equal to 22.1 days of effective NBTI device aging under normal working conditions in the field, we calculate thep interA under RT using a strategy of randomly selecting responses. Results in Fig. 4 imply thatp interA is only slightly higher than p intraA . More specifically, the difference betweenp interA andp intraA is only around 1%. This indicates that only a small fraction of responses are sensitive to aging. We can see from our analyses in Section 3.2 that using a random response selection strategy for recycled SoCs detection is cumbersome.
Next, we first implement the ASR selection approach outlined in Algorithm 1 and then demonstrate the significantly improved difference betweenp interA andp intraA that consequently facilitates the detection capability.
ASR Detection Capability Results
We apply the ASR selection according to Algorithm 1. Noting that bothp intraA andp interA are a function of N , which is number of a response reevaluated under a given RT and HT. The purpose of the selection process is to increase the difference betweenp interA andp intraA whilst also making sure that thep intraA is small as well. Mean ofp interA ,p intraA , andp interA −p intraA as a function of N settings for those selected ASRs are depicted in Fig. 5 (a) .
We can see thatp intraA , when ASR is implemented, is always larger than thep intraA of around 6% without ASR selection, see Fig. 4 , this is because the ASRs are also tending to be erroneous when they are regenerated under RT before aging. However, thep interA is increased faster, therefore, largerp interA −p intraA is achieved. In addition, thep intraA decreases as the N increases with slightly improvedp interA −p intraA . Overall, as we shall see in Table 1 , a larger N yields a higher detection capability. In Fig. 5 (b) , the number of selected ASRs out of 262,144 responses are depicted. We can expect that the number of ASRs to decrease as N increases because less number of responses are able to satisfy the selection criterion in Algorithm 1. Therefore, a larger N leads to less number of selected ASRs but higher sensitivity to aging for those selected ASRs.
In Table. 1, we give results of quantitatively evaluations of n-minimal bit length of the response to meet the EER, and n th or n EER of SRAM PUF being used to detect recycled SoCs under differentp interA andp intraA . We can see from Table. 1, the necessary bit length of n decreases as N is increasing. For example, n is reduced by more than 63% by increasing N from three to nine whilst both FAR and FRR are guaranteed to be less than 0.001. This validates the high efficacy of the presented ASR selection methodology. Using ASRs that are more sensitive to aging expedite the detecting of recycled commodity SoCs as less response bits need to be acquired during an evaluation. In addition, the volume needed to securely store reference ASRs in database is reduced or relaxed.
Besides the above 48 hrs accelerated aging period, we also test the detection capability given two other accelerated aging periods: 18 hrs and 108 hrs-equal to 8.3 and 49.6 days of SoC operation in the field. The evaluated detection capability is detailed in Table 2 . We set N = 9 for all evaluations. We can see that longer aging periods are easier to detect with fewer number of ASRs while guaranteeing the same detection capability, e.g., EER threshold. In practice, given the same n, if the FAR is more critical than FRR-this maybe the case as FAR poses a security concern by mistakenly accepting recycled SoCs, a smaller n th can be adopted.
Conclusion
In this study, we experimentally validate the use of embedded SRAMs in off-the-shelf microcontrollers to detect the periods that SoCs work in the field. It is validated that both FAR and FRR can be less than 10 −4 when the SoCs experiences only nine days aging. The simplified ASR selection method considerably reduces the necessary number of SRAM PUF response bits to achieve the required detection capability by employing responses that exhibit higher sensitivity to aging effects. In addition, adding the ability of aging sensing to the popular SRAM PUF extends its function to secure IC supply chains by not only preventing cloned and overproduced ICs but also from recycled ones. Most importantly, detection of recycled commercial SoCs embedded with SRAM memories requires no modification to the original design, and thus cost-free is achieved. 
